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Abstract
This paper analyzes a model of strategic tax competition with mobile capital and
mobile identical consumers. The results of the model are compared to the traditional
strategic tax competition model with immobile population. In addition to the fiscal
and pecuniary externalities present in the standard model, a new effect shows up in the
mobility model to affect provision of the public good. As with the pecuniary externality,
this new effect depends on whether the jurisdictions are net exporters or net importers
of capital. Thus, in a symmetric set up, the mobility effect along with the pecuniary
externality disappear, yielding unambiguous underprovision of the public good. While in
the asymmetric case both models have the same qualitative results, the mobility model
strengthens the effects of the pecuniary externality. The above results are obtained by
comparing the form of the first-order conditions between the mobility and immobility
cases. The remaining question is whether or not the equilibrium levels of the public goods
conform to the predicted tendencies. This question is answered with an example. The
results of this exercise show that when the jurisdiction is a net exporter of capital, the
level of the public good is lower in the mobility case than in the immobility case. However,
if the jurisdiction is a net importer of capital, the public good level is sometimes higher
and sometimes lower in the mobility case, contrary to predictions.
Strategic Tax Competition with a Mobile Population
Gonzalo E. Ferna´ndez∗
1 Introduction
Since the mid-80s, a huge public finance literature has focused on the fiscal interaction among
governments due to tax-base mobility, which generates what is known as “tax competition”. In
tax competition models, the analysis investigates the distortions that a tax on mobile capital
causes in an economy where the tax revenue is used to finance public expenditure. The problem
arises when one jurisdiction raises its capital-tax rate in order to increase the level of the
public good. The net-of-tax return in that jurisdiction then falls below that prevailing in other
jurisdictions, and capital relocates to other communities until net returns are equalized. This
capital relocation is perceived as a cost by the community, which tends to reduce the level of
provision of the public good.
The first studies analyzed models within a purely competitive setup. In this framework,
there are a large number of competing communities, each providing, to a fixed immobile popu-
lation, a local public good financed with a tax on capital employed locally. The total capital in
the economy is fixed, but capital is mobile among jurisdictions. Jurisdictions are small relative
to the economy, so that they do not affect the net-of-tax return to capital. Strategic interaction
is then absent (tax rates of other communities are irrelevant), and each jurisdiction chooses
its tax rate taking capital’s net return as parametric. This model is analyzed by Beck (1983),
Wilson (1986), and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986).
A more recent literature has investigated models of tax competition when strategic interac-
tion among communities is present. In this case, jurisdictions are large relative to the economy.
∗The model in this paper draws on a suggestion of John D. Wilson. He is not responsible, of course, for any
shortcomings in the analysis.
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Then each jurisdiction, by changing its capital-tax rate, is able to modify the net-of-tax return
to capital (the capital outflow, due to a higher tax rate, is large enough to depress the net
return). Therefore, to choose their optimal tax rates, jurisdictions take into account interjuris-
dictional capital flows and their effects on the net return to capital, viewing tax rates chosen
by other jurisdictions as parametric. Wildasin (1988) and Bucovetsky (1991) are examples of
this kind of model.
In both kinds of models, equilibrium is inefficient, with the public good typically underpro-
vided. This outcome is generated by the presence of two externalities. First, each jurisdiction
ignores the positive externality it generates when it increases the capital tax rate (a higher
tax rate causes capital to flow to other jurisdictions). The second externality appears when
jurisdictions are large. In this case, the increase in the capital tax rate in a given jurisdiction
depresses the earnings of all capital owners by lowering the net return to capital. When all
jurisdictions are alike (symmetric case) this second externality vanishes. The reason is that
each jurisdiction is then a zero exporter of capital. However, equilibrium tax rates are too low
because each jurisdiction ignores the external gains from capital flows caused by an increase in
its tax rate. Even though the capital stock ends up evenly divided among jurisdictions in the
symmetric case, jurisdiction’s fears of tax base flight induce low tax rates. In equilibrium these
fears are misplaced, and the resulting tax rates are too low.
Most of these models consider the population of each jurisdiction as fixed. However, some
recent articles include consumer mobility in their models. See Hoyt (1991a, 1993), Burbidge
and Myers (1994), Henderson (1994), and Wilson (1997). These papers analyze the effect that
different taxes have in models where land is present, and where local governments choose the
fiscal variables. Brueckner (2000) analyzes a perfectly competitive model where jurisdictions
are formed by profit-maximizing community developers and heterogeneous consumers sort ac-
cording to their preferences.
The purpose of the present paper is to analyze a model of strategic tax competition with a
mobile population, while attempting to maintain other features of the standard model. To do
so, consumers are viewed as homogeneous, in contrast to Brueckner (2000). In addition, land
plays no role in the model, in contrast to the papers mentioned above.
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One departure from the standard setup, however, is the use of the community-developer
model, which follows Brueckner (2000). The reason for using this model is that, when popu-
lations are mobile, it is not clear what is the right objective function for the community in a
utility-maximizing framework. Is it the common utility level of the consumers, both within the
community and outside? Is it the community population times the utility (i.e. “total utility”
for community residents)? These issues disappear with the developer model since total profit
is the unambiguous objective.
In this framework, developers maximize profit by choosing capital-tax rates and public good
levels. Consumers are identical and each owns k units of capital. They are free to chose where
to reside and where to invest their capital (it could be in a different jurisdiction). So developers
compete strategically for capital, and they have to ensure that each consumer in the community
reaches at least the level of utility that prevails in other jurisdictions.
The analysis of the equilibrium shows that, in addition to the two externalities explained
above, there is a third effect that operates through population mobility. An explanation for this
effect (in a context with two jurisdictions) is that when the tax rate in jurisdiction i increases,
consumer income in jurisdiction j changes. The direction of this change depends on whether
jurisdiction i is a net exporter or net importer of capital. In the first case, total income in
jurisdiction j increases when the tax rate in jurisdiction i increases. Then the level of public
good in jurisdiction i must be increased to keep the utility level in jurisdiction i equal to the
utility level in the other jurisdiction. This increase in the level of public good is another cost
of raising the tax rate. However, if jurisdiction i is a net importer, income in jurisdiction j
falls when the tax rate in i is raised, and the public good level in jurisdiction i can be reduced.
Therefore, the developer in jurisdiction i enjoys an added benefit from increasing the tax rate.
When jurisdictions are large enough and different (i.e. with different production functions),
the results of the mobile population model differ from the results of the standard asymmetric
tax competition model. The reason for this difference is the presence of the new mobility effect.
If the community is a net exporter of capital, the extra cost imposed by the mobility of the
population tends to generate greater underprovision than in the fixed-population setup.
In the symmetric case (when jurisdictions have the same production functions) the outcome
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of the model is equivalent to that in the standard fixed-population model. Since in equilibrium
all jurisdictions are alike, each one is a zero of exporter of capital. Then the effect of the
second externality explained above vanishes in both types of models. The new effect of free
mobility also depends on the community being a net exporter or net importer of capital, so
under symmetry it also is not present.
Section 2 presents the model and compares the results with those of the fixed-population
tax competition model. Section 3 explores a particular example for the asymmetric case, and
section 4 generalizes the model to J jurisdictions. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model and Analysis of the Equilibrium
2.1 The Model
The economy is divided in two jurisdictions governed by community developers. The developers
behave strategically, taking account of the effect of their tax-rate choices on the net return to
capital. Competitive firms in each jurisdiction produce a numeraire private good, xi, with a
constant-returns technology. The production function for the private good in jurisdiction i is
Fi(Ki, Ni), where Ki gives the capital input in jurisdiction i and Ni is the labor input. Notice
that since each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor, Ni is also the population in
jurisdiction i. Expressed in intensive form, the production function is fi(ki) ≡ Fi(ki, 1), where
ki equals capital per worker in jurisdiction i.
Community developers control provision of the public good, and they levy a tax per unit
of capital to finance the provision of the good, with ti denoting the tax rate in community
i. Capital is freely mobile, so the net-of-tax return on capital, ρ, must be equal in both
jurisdictions. That is,
f ′1(k1)− t1 = ρ (1)
f ′2(k2)− t2 = ρ. (2)
Let wi denote the wage in jurisdiction i. Then,
w1 = f1(k1)− k1f ′1(k1) (3)
4
w2 = f2(k2)− k2f ′2(k2). (4)
The resource constraint is given by
N1
N
k1 +
N2
N
k2 =
K
N
, (5)
where K is the fixed total amount of capital in the economy and N is total population in the
economy. Letting θ = N1
N
denote the population share of jurisdiction 1, (5) can be written as
θk1 + (1− θ)k2 = k. (6)
Equations (1)-(4) and (6) determine k1, k2, w1, w2 and ρ as functions of t1, t2 and θ. Then
community developers, through their choice of taxes, influence the levels of these variables. In
particular, the effects of changing t1 are
1
∂ρ
∂t1
= − θf
′′
2 (k2)
θf ′′2 (k2) + (1− θ)f ′′1 (k1)
< 0 (7)
∂k1
∂t1
=
(1− θ)
θf ′′2 (k2) + (1− θ)f ′′1 (k1)
< 0 (8)
∂k2
∂t1
= − θ
θf ′′2 (k2) + (1− θ)f ′′1 (k1)
> 0 (9)
∂w1
∂t1
= −k1f ′′1 (k1)
∂k1
∂t1
= − (1− θ)k1f
′′
1 (k1)
θf ′′2 (k2) + (1− θ)f ′′1 (k1)
< 0 (10)
∂w2
∂t1
= −k2f ′′2 (k2)
∂k2
∂t1
=
θk2f
′′
2 (k2)
θf ′′2 (k2) + (1− θ)f ′′1 (k1)
> 0. (11)
As indicated in the introduction, an increase in the tax rate in jurisdiction 1 lowers capital’s
net return ρ. Also, capital relocates, flowing from jurisdiction 1 to jurisdiction 2. This flow of
capital causes wages to fall in the jurisdiction where the tax rate is increased and to rise in the
other jurisdiction.
1The effects of changing t2 are analogous.
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Turning to the remaining assumptions of the model, the private good can either be consumed
directly as a private commodity, x, or used to produce a public good z at a constant cost of
c per unit. Since z is a publicly provided private good, the cost of providing zi units of the
public good in jurisdiction i is cNizi.
Consumers have identical preferences represented by a well-behaved utility function, U(xi, zi).
Private good consumption is equal to the consumer’s wage income plus income from capital.
Since it is assumed that ownership of the total stock of capital is equally shared among all
individuals in the economy, utility can be written as U(xi, zi) = U(wi + ρk, zi).
Developers collect taxes on capital, keeping any excess tax revenue as profits. So the ob-
jective function for jurisdiction i is Ni(tiki − czi). The developer’s choice variables are ti and
zi, the tax rate and public good level. In setting these variables, the developer takes into
account the effects of his decision on capital usage, on wages, and on the after-tax return
to capital. However, in maximizing profits, developers treat population as parametric, even
though the population ultimately adjusts among jurisdictions to satisfy the equilibrium condi-
tions. Consistent with their parametric view of population sizes, developers attempt to offer
the inhabitants of their community the same utility level as residents of other communities. In
doing this, they rule out the possibility of jurisdictional utility differentials that would lead to
relocation of the population. Thus, the optimization problem for the developer in jurisdiction
1 is
max
(t1,z1)
Π1 = max(t1,z1){θN(t1k1 − cz1)}
subject to (1)-(4), (6), and the free mobility constraint
U(w1 + ρk, z1) = U(w2 + ρk, z2).
The developer of jurisdiction 2 faces a similar problem.
Taking into account equations (1)-(4) and (6), which determine k1, k2, w1, w2 and ρ as
functions of t1, t2 and θ, the first-order conditions for the developer are
t1 : θN
(
k1 + t1
∂k1
∂t1
)
+ λ
[
Ux(w1 + ρk, z1)
(
∂w1
∂t1
+ k
∂ρ
∂t1
)
−Ux(w2 + ρk, z2)
(
∂w2
∂t1
+ k
∂ρ
∂t1
)]
= 0
(12)
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z1 : −θNc+ λUz(w1 + ρk, z1) = 0 (13)
λ : U(w1 + ρk, z1)− U(w2 + ρk, z2) = 0, (14)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the “equal utility” constraint.
From equations (12) and (13) the following condition is obtained:
Uz(w1 + ρk, z1)
Ux(w1 + ρk, z1)
=
c
k1 + t1
∂k1
∂t1
{
k1 + (k1 − k)
[
1 +
θ
(1− θ)
Ux(w2 + ρk, z2)
Ux(w1 + ρk, z1)
]
∂ρ
∂t1
}
. (15)
The interpretation of this condition is left until the next section.
Finally a free entry condition is imposed. It is assumed that there are many potential
developers that may enter to compete for a particular jurisdiction if profits are positive. Then,
in equilibrium, both jurisdictions earn zero profits.2 Thus,
Π1 = θN(t1k1 − cz1) = 0. (16)
Equations (14), (15), (16) and the analogous conditions for jurisdiction 2 determine the values
of t1, t2, z1, z2, and θ.
3
2.2 Analysis of the Equilibrium
In this section, the equilibrium conditions of the model are analyzed using as a benchmark
the traditional strategic tax-competition model with fixed population. In that model, the
government of each jurisdiction maximizes the utility of a representative individual taking into
account the effects of its tax choice on ρ subject to a budget constraint.4 Thus, the optimization
problem is
max
t1,z1
U(x1, z1)
s. t. t1k1 = cz1 ,
2This can be seen clearly in a model where developers bid for land to develop a jurisdiction. In this case, the
presence of positive profits would cause bids for land to increase until profits are reduced to zero. For simplicity,
however, land is not included in the model.
3Notice that there are five unknowns and five equations since equation (14) is repeated.
4See Wildasin (1988), Hoyt (1991b).
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where k1 is determined from (1), (2), and (6), and where x1 = w1+ρk. The first order condition
for this problem is
Uz(w1 + ρk, z1)
Ux(w1 + ρk, z1)
=
c
k1 + t1
∂k1
∂t1
[
k1 + (k1 − k) ∂ρ
∂t1
]
. (17)
The comparison between models focuses on the provision of the public good. The relevant
conditions that need to be compared are then equations (15) and (17).
Equation (17) shows that the marginal benefit differs from the marginal cost of production
of the public good (c).5 This is due to the presence of two externalities. The first is known in
the tax-competition literature as a fiscal externality. In (17), jurisdiction 1 ignores the benefit in
jurisdiction 2 from the relocation of capital when its tax rate increases. This effect is captured
by the denominator expression on the RHS of (17), which is less than unity, tending to make
the RHS greater than c. With the MRS tending to be greater than c, the fiscal externality
tends to make equilibrium tax rates too low.
The second externality is known as a pecuniary externality.6 This externality shows up
when the jurisdictions are big enough to influence the “terms-of-trade” by changing ρ when
they change their tax rates. As explained above, the direction of this effect, which is captured
by the second term in brackets in (17), depends on whether the jurisdiction is a net importer
or net exporter of capital. When the jurisdiction is a net importer of capital (when ki > k),
the community benefits from a lower value of ρ. The government then has an extra incentive
to increase the tax rate, and as a result, overprovision of the public good may occur. This
follows because the second term in (17) is negative when ki > k, tending to decrease the RHS
expression below c. On the other hand, net-exporter jurisdictions are harmed by the lower
value of ρ caused by a higher capital tax. This effect aggravates underprovision of the public
good (in this case, the second term in (17) is positive, reinforcing the tendency of the RHS to
exceed c).
5The marginal benefit is the sum of the resident’s marginal willingness to pay for one more unit of z,∑
Uz/Ux = N1Uz/Ux. Since z is a publicly provided private good, the marginal cost of producing z for N1
residents is cN1. The N1 then cancels out in (17).
6See DePater and Myers (1994).
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These two externalities are also present in the mobility model. However, a third effect
appears in equation (15), captured by the term involving the ratio of the Ux’s. To see the
origin of this term, note that when the tax rate is incremented in jurisdiction 1, consumer
income in jurisdiction 2 (w2 + ρk) changes. Using (7) and (11), this change is given by
∂(w2 + ρk)
∂t1
=
θ(k2 − k)f ′′2
θf ′′2 + (1− θ)f ′′1
 > 0 if jurisdiction 1 is a net exporter< 0 if jurisdiction 1 is a net importer.
If jurisdiction 1 is a net exporter of capital, then w2 + ρk increases when t1 increases.
Utility then rises in jurisdiction 2, and z1 must increase to maintain the utility equality. But
this increase in z1 reduces the developer’s profit, lowering the benefit of raising t1. So the
mobility effect reinforces the effect of the pecuniary externality, strengthening the tendency of
the net-exporter jurisdiction to keep the tax rate low, aggravating underprovision of the public
good. However, if community 1 is a net importer, then w2+ρk decreases with an increase of t1,
and z1 can be reduced. As noted above, in this case the pecuniary externality from raising t1 is
beneficial, and the mobility effect adds another benefit. This strengthens the forces causing the
net importer to raise its tax rate, increasing the tendency toward overprovision of the public
good.
In the symmetric case, where production functions in both jurisdictions are identical, juris-
dictions do not export or import capital in equilibrium. Therefore, like the pecuniary exter-
nality, the mobility effect vanishes in this case. Since k1 = k2 = k holds in equilibrium, (15)
reduces to
Uz(w1 + ρk, z1)
Ux(w1 + ρk, z1)
=
c
k1 + t1
∂k1
∂t1
k1 =
c
1 + (t1/k1)
∂k1
∂t1
. (18)
However, inspection of (17) shows that this equation also reduces to (18) in the symmetric
case. Therefore, provided that communities are symmetric, the strategic equilibrium is unaf-
fected by the presence of population mobility. This is an important result because it shows
that, in the symmetric case, the main conclusions of the standard strategic model are robust
to the presence of population mobility. Summarizing the preceding discussion yields
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Proposition 1 (i) In the symmetric case, where production functions are the same in both
jurisdictions, the equilibrium in the mobile population model is the same as the equilibrium in
the utility-maximizing model with fixed (and equal) populations.
(ii) In the asymmetric case, when production functions are different across jurisdictions, the
mobile population model predicts underprovision of the public good in the jurisdiction that is a
net exporter of capital, but over or underprovision may occur in the net-importer jurisdiction.
These results are the same as in the standard model.
(iii) The form of the first-order conditions suggests that, in the mobility case, the tendency
to underprovide the public good is strengthened for the net-exporter jurisdiction, and that any
tendency to overprovide the public good is strengthened for the net-importer jurisdiction.
While the first and second parts of Proposition 1 show that the same qualitative results
apply to the models with and without population mobility, the third part is a statement based
on a comparison of the form of the first-order conditions for the two types of models. However,
as is well known from research in other areas of public economics, a comparison of the optimality
rules across models does not necessarily translate into a straightforward comparison of the levels
of the choice variables.7
To see this issue in the present contest, suppose that the allocation of capital per worker
happened to be the same in the mobility and immobility cases, yielding the same values of k1
and k2 for these cases, as well as the same values of w1 and w2. Suppose further that k1 < k2,
so that community 1 is the net exporter. Then, consider the question of whether the mobility
equilibrium could have the same values of z1 and z2 as the immobility equilibrium. For this to be
true, the values of t1 and t2 would have to be the same across equilibria, also implying a common
value of ρ. Under these conditions, however, it is easily seen that the MRS expression in (15),
which is equal to that in (17) given equality of arguments, is less than the RHS expression in
(15). This conclusion follows because of the presence of the extra positive term on the RHS
of (15) when community 1 is a net exporter. With the MRS less than the RHS expression in
(15), the implication is that z1 is too large, suggesting that its value must be reduced relative
to the value in the immobility equilibrium to satisfy the optimality condition for the mobility
case. Thus, the extent of underprovision in the net-exporting community should be larger in
the mobility case. Reversing this argument for the case where community 1 is a net importer, it
7See Atkinson and Stern (1974).
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follows that the level of z1 should be larger in the mobility case for a net-importer community.
If the public good is overprovided in that community, this worsens the extent of overprovision.
If underprovision occurs, however, the conclusion is that underprovision is less severe.
This discussion, however, is based on an assumption (identical capital stocks per worker
in both equilibria) that typically will not be satisfied. As a result, the above predictions are
only suggestive and may not actually hold. To investigate this issue further, the next section
presents numerical examples comparing equilibria in the mobility and immobility cases.
3 An Example
To explore in more detail the differences between these two models in the asymmetric case
(where production functions differ across jurisdictions), a particular example is presented. In
the example, production functions are assumed to be quadratic, so that
f1(k1) = (V − bk1)k1 (19)
f2(k2) = (W − dk2)k2. (20)
Then, the return to capital in each jurisdiction is given by
V − 2bk1 = ρ+ t1 (21)
W − 2dk2 = ρ+ t2, (22)
and the return to labor by
w1 = bk
2
1 (23)
w2 = dk
2
2. (24)
The resource constraint is again
θk1 + (1− θ)k2 = k, (25)
where θ again is the share of the population in jurisdiction 1 and k is per capita capital in the
economy. The consumer utility function is assumed to be linear, so that
U(xi, zi) = xi + azi. (26)
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This assumption, which is highly restrictive, is necessary to generate numerical solutions to the
equilibrium conditions. Linearity yields a constant MRS equal to a on the LHS’s of both (15)
and (17), while also generating a unitary value for the ratio of Ux’s in (15). These simplifications
facilitate a solution to the respective equilibrium systems, which remain highly nonlinear.
From (21), (22), and (25) k1, k2, and ρ are obtained as functions of t1, t2 and θ:
k1 =
dk + (1− θ)(t2 − t1 + V −W )/2
dθ + b(1− θ) (27)
k2 =
bk − θ(t2 − t1 + V −W )/2
dθ + b(1− θ) (28)
ρ = V − t1 − 2b(dk + (1− θ)(t2 − t1 + V −W )/2)
dθ + b(1− θ) . (29)
Solving the developer’s optimization problem for this example, the equilibrium conditions
(14), (15), and (16) (along with the analogous conditions for jurisdiction 2) reduce to
w1 + az1 = w2 + az2 (30)
a =
c
k1 + t1
∂k1
∂t1
[
k1 + (k1 − k) 1
(1− θ)
∂ρ
∂t1
]
(31)
a =
c
k2 + t2
∂k2
∂t2
[
k2 + (k2 − k)1
θ
∂ρ
∂t2
]
(32)
θN(t1k1 − cz1) = 0 (33)
(1− θ)N(t2k2 − cz2) = 0. (34)
Equations (23), (24), (27)-(34), constitute a system of ten equations and ten unknowns (k1,
k2, ρ, w1, w2, t1, t2, z1, z2, and θ) that can be solved for different values of the parameters of
the model (c, a, V , W , b, and d).
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The optimality conditions for the immobility model are given by (17) and the analogous
conditions for the other jurisdiction. In this example, these conditions are
a =
c
k1 + t1
∂k1
∂t1
[
k1 + (k1 − k) ∂ρ
∂t1
]
(35)
a =
c
k2 + t2
∂k2
∂t2
[
k2 + (k2 − k) ∂ρ
∂t2
]
. (36)
Simultaneously solving equations (27)-(29), (35), and (36), the equilibrium values for k1,
k2, t1, t2, and ρ are obtained as functions of the parameters of the problem (c, a, V , W , b, d,
and θ8). All the other variables (z1, z2, w1, w2, x1, x2) are solved for by substitution.
To compare the two models, the following exercise is carried out. First, the mobility model
is solved for given values of the parameters. Among other values, the equilibrium population
share θ is obtained. Then this equilibrium θ value is taken as a parameter in solving the
immobility model. In this way, both models have the same population distribution.
Solutions are obtained using Mathematica for the following parameter values: c = 1, b =
d = 1, V = 4, W = 4.01. Note that V < W implies that jurisdiction 2 is the more productive.
The parameter a is changed from 1.1 to 1.5 to see what happens when the MRS is increased.
It is important to explain why W = 4.01 is chosen. After running some simulations for
several values of W , it was found that the results of the mobility model are very sensitive to
the difference between V and W . Incrementing this difference (holding the value of a constant)
by more than 0.01128 leads to nonexistence of equilibrium.9
The results are presented in Tables 1-6. In Table 1, the case where a = 1.1 is shown. For
the mobility model, the equilibrium values for θ, t1, t2, and ρ, are 0.209155, 0.272817, 0.412331,
and 1.62476, respectively. The level of capital per worker in jurisdiction 1 (k1) is 1.05121 and
level of capital per worker in jurisdiction 2 (k2) is 0.986456. Public good levels are 0.286788
for community 1 and 0.406746 for community 2. Finally, equilibrium values for wages, level of
private good, and utilities in both communities are shown in the last six rows. The third column
8In this model the population share is fixed.
9Calculations forW = 4.01127 are available upon request. The results are not presented in the paper because
they follow the same pattern as those for W = 4.01.
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displays the resulting values of the same variables for the immobility model, when a = 1.1 and
θ is fixed at 0.209155.
The Tables show that, under the above parameters, jurisdiction 1 is the net importer of
capital and jurisdiction 2 the net exporter. Then, as the theory predicts, the tax rate on
capital in the net-importer jurisdiction is lower than in the net-exporter jurisdiction, and this
is true for both models.
Comparing the results for both models, it can be observed that for the net-exporter ju-
risdiction, the level of public good is always (for any value of a) smaller in the mobility case
than in the immobility case. So the prediction of section 2.1 seems to hold. Then, looking at
the net-importer jurisdiction, one would expect to find that the level of public good is always
greater in the mobility model. However, this is not the case. For example, for values of a ≤ 1.3,
the level of public good in the net-importer jurisdiction is lower in the mobility case. This
outcome contradicts the prediction made above, and the reason is that, rather than being the
same in both equilibria, the values of k1 and k2 are different.
Two additional observations can be made. First, notice that the capital level in the net-
importer jurisdiction is always lower in the mobility case than in the immobility case. On the
other hand, the capital level in the net-exporter jurisdiction is always higher under free mobility.
This suggest that free population mobility smooths capital differences among jurisdictions.
Finally, looking at the resulting utility levels for the immobility model, it can be seen that
the small community inhabitants are always better off. This result was shown by Bucovetsky
(1991), who demonstrated that when jurisdictions are different and use quadratic production
functions, people in the small jurisdiction reach a higher level of utility than people in the big
jurisdiction.
4 Generalization of the model
Now consider a model with J jurisdictions. For each jurisdiction i, ki(θ1, ..., θJ , t1, ..., tJ),
wi(θ1, ..., θJ , t1, ..., tJ), and ρ are determined by the following 2J + 1 equations:
f ′i(ki) = ρ+ ti, i = 1, ..., J (37)
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wi = fi(ki)− kif ′i(ki), i = 1, ..., J (38)
J∑
i=1
θiki = k. (39)
Differentiating equations (37) and (39) with respect to ti yields
∂ki
∂ti
=
∑
j 6=i(θj/f ′′j (kj))
f ′′i (ki)
∑J
j=1(θj/f
′′
j (kj))
< 0 (40)
∂kj
∂ti
= − θi
f ′′i (ki)f ′′j (kj)
∑J
j=1(θj/f
′′
j (kj))
> 0, ∀j 6= i (41)
∂ρ
∂ti
= − θi/f
′′
i (ki)∑J
j=1(θj/f
′′
j (kj))
< 0. (42)
Now the problem for a particular developer i is to
max
(ti,zi)
Πi = max(ti,zi){θiN(tiki − czi)}
s. t. (37) - (39), and
U(wi + ρk, zi) = U(wj + ρk, zj), ∀j 6= i .
The first order conditions of this problem are:
ti : θiN
(
ki+ti
∂ki
∂ti
)
+
∑
j 6=i
λij
[
Ux(wi+ρk, zi)
(
∂wi
∂ti
+k
∂ρ
∂ti
)
−Ux(wj+ρk, zj)
(
∂wj
∂ti
+k
∂ρ
∂ti
)]
= 0
(43)
zi : −θiNc+
∑
j 6=i
λijUz(wi + ρk, zi) = 0 (44)
λij : U(wi + ρk, zi)− U(wj + ρk, zj) = 0, j = 1, ..., i− 1, i+ 1, ..., J, (45)
where the λij’s are the J-1 Lagrange multipliers for jurisdiction i.
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These J+1 conditions plus the zero profit condition for jurisdiction i (tiki − czi = 0) de-
termine the values of zi, ti, θi and the J-1 Lagrange multipliers as a function of taxes, public
goods, and population shares of the other J-1 jurisdictions. Since there are J jurisdictions fac-
ing the same maximization problem, we have 2J + J2 unknowns (z1, ..., zJ , t1, ..., tJ , θ1, ..., θJ ,
λ12, ..., λ
1
J , ..., λ
j
1, ..., λ
j
j−1, λ
j
j+1, ..., λ
j
J , ..., λ
J
1 , ..., λ
J
J−1) and 2J + J
2 equations.10
An equation analogous to (15) can be obtained for the general case from (43) and (44).
This is
Uz(wi + ρk, zi)
Ux(wi + ρk, zi)
=
c
ki + ti
∂ki
∂ti
ki+ (ki− k) ∂ρ∂ti − 1(∑j 6=i λij)
∑
j 6=i
λij(kj− k)
Ux(wj + ρk, zj)
Ux(wi + ρk, zi)
∂ρ
∂ti
 .
(46)
Now the extra term in the general model is more complicated than in the 2-jurisdiction
model because of the presence of the different λ’s. But in the symmetric case (where the
production function is the same in all jurisdictions), ki = k holds for all i, and the second
and third terms in braces in (46) disappear, yielding (18) for i = 1, ..., J .11 This confirms the
first part of Proposition 1 for the generalized case. However, the second and third parts of the
proposition do not follow.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, a model of strategic tax competition with mobile capital and mobile identical
consumers is analyzed. The results of the model are compared to the traditional strategic tax
competition model with immobile population.
As is well known, the presence of two externalities (a fiscal externality and a pecuniary
externality) affects provision of the public good in the standard model. In the mobility model,
in addition to those externalities, a new effect shows up. As with the pecuniary externality, this
new effect depends on whether the jurisdictions are net exporters or net importers of capital.
10Notice that some restrictions are repeated, then some Lagrange multipliers are equal, e.g. λij = λ
j
i . So there
are
(
J
2
)
= J!2!(J−2)! =
J(J−1)
2 different restrictions, and the number of unknowns and equations is 3J +
J(J−1)
2 .
11Notice that, the fact that θi = 1J = θ holds in the symmetric case can be used along with (40) to yield
∂ki
∂ti
= 1−θ
f ′′(k)
= J−1J
1
f ′′(k)
. Equation (46) then collapses to UzUx =
c
k+ti(J−1)/Jf ′′(k)k.
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Thus, in a symmetric set up, the mobility effect along with the pecuniary externality disappear,
yielding unambiguous underprovision of the public good.
While in the asymmetric case both models have the same qualitative results (underprovision
of the public good if the jurisdiction is a net exporter of capital, and over or underprovision
in the net-importer case), the mobility model strengthens the effects of the pecuniary exter-
nality. Then, if the jurisdiction is a net exporter (net importer) of capital, the tendency for
underprovision (overprovision) is reinforced by the presence of population mobility.
The above results are obtained by comparing the form of the first-order conditions between
the mobility and immobility cases. The remaining question is whether or not the equilibrium
levels of the public goods conform to the predicted tendencies. This question revisits the “rules
vs. levels” issue seen elsewhere in public economics. The question is answered with an example
using quadratic production functions and linear utility functions. The results of this exercise
show that when the jurisdiction is a net exporter of capital, the level of the public good is
lower in the mobility case than in the immobility case (as Proposition 1 suggests). However,
if the jurisdiction is a net importer of capital, the public good level is sometimes higher and
sometimes lower in the mobility case, contrary to predictions.
Finally, the model is generalized for J jurisdictions. As in the standard model, underpro-
vision of the public good is the outcome of the mobility model in the symmetric case. But
nothing can be said in the asymmetric case, since the form of the first-order conditions are
more complicated than in the 2-jurisdiction case.
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Table 1.
Model Mobility Immobility
a 1.1 1.1
θ 0.209155 0.209155
t1 0.272817 0.314504
t2 0.412331 0.625519
ρ 1.62476 1.44744
k1 1.05121 1.11903
k2 0.986456 0.968521
z1 0.286788 0.351939
z2 0.406746 0.605828
w1 1.10504 1.25223
w2 0.973095 0.938033
x1 2.7298 2.69967
x2 2.59786 2.38547
U(x1, z1) 3.04527 3.0868
U(x2, z2) 3.04527 3.05188
Table 2.
Model Mobility Immobility
a 1.15 1.15
θ 0.381831 0.381831
t1 0.474312 0.476533
t2 0.562672 0.604445
ρ 1.47725 1.45058
k1 1.02422 1.03644
k2 0.98504 0.977489
z1 0.4858 0.493898
z2 0.554254 0.590838
w1 1.04903 1.07421
w2 0.970304 0.955485
x1 2.52628 2.52479
x2 2.44755 2.40606
U(x1, z1) 3.08495 3.09277
U(x2, z2) 3.08495 3.08553
Table 3.
Model Mobility Immobility
a 1.2 1.2
θ 0.42823 0.42823
t1 0.630743 0.627786
t2 0.701136 0.723361
ρ 1.33473 1.32328
k1 1.01727 1.02446
k2 0.987069 0.981677
z1 0.641636 0.643142
z2 0.69207 0.710107
w1 1.03484 1.04952
w2 0.974305 0.96369
x1 2.36957 2.3728
x2 2.30904 2.28697
U(x1, z1) 3.13952 3.14457
U(x2, z2) 3.13952 3.1391
Table 4.
Model Mobility Immobility
a 1.3 1.3
θ 0.462055 0.462055
t1 0.896639 0.892368
t2 0.95002 0.961054
ρ 1.08002 1.07606
k1 1.01167 1.01578
k2 0.989978 0.986442
z1 0.907103 0.90645
z2 0.940499 0.948024
w1 1.02348 1.03181
w2 0.980056 0.973068
x1 2.1035 2.10787
x2 2.06008 2.04913
U(x1, z1) 3.28273 3.28625
U(x2, z2) 3.28273 3.28156
Table 5.
Model Mobility Immobility
a 1.4 1.4
θ 0.474847 0.474847
t1 1.12073 1.1169
t2 1.16574 1.17296
ρ 0.860884 0.858911
k1 1.00919 1.01209
k2 0.991688 0.989064
z1 1.13103 1.1304
z2 1.15605 1.16013
w1 1.01846 1.02433
w2 0.983445 0.978248
x1 1.81935 1.88324
x2 1.84433 1.83716
U(x1, z1) 3.46279 3.4658
U(x2, z2) 3.46279 3.46134
Table 6.
Model Mobility Immobility
a 1.5 1.5
θ 0.481255 0.481255
t1 1.31371 1.31042
t2 1.35371 1.35904
ρ 0.670728 0.669546
k1 1.00778 1.01002
k2 0.992781 0.990707
z1 1.32393 1.32355
z2 1.34394 1.34641
w1 1.01562 1.02014
w2 0.985614 0.9815
x1 1.68635 1.68969
x2 1.65634 1.65105
U(x1, z1) 3.67225 3.67501
U(x2, z2) 3.67225 3.67066
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